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writing, however legible, to be convincing as working papers;
explaining their role, to the extent it is not already done, would
be a small price to pay for complete legibility.
Oehler's book is satisfying on another and minor score; the
term "equity of creditors" is used only as a section heading, and
debts and proprietary items on the balance sheet are generally
referred to by Oehler as interests of creditors and interests of
owners. It has seemed regrettable to me that as the use of the term
"liabilities" is generally being contracted and rendered more
meaningful in balance sheet terminology by excluding from it
proprietary items, another corruption is developing in its place,
namely the use of the term "equities" to cover both creditor and
owner interests. Such use of the latter term is particularly confusing in reorganization law and accounting where the respective
interests of creditors and stockholders have come to be referred
to as debt claims and equity claims. I suppose if the use of it in
this fashion has historical justification it lies in the analogy to the
"equity of redemption" notion developed in connection with mortgage foreclosures in courts of equity. In the light of this history,
it seems somehow anomalous to refer to the claim of a first mortgage bondholder as an "equity," yet, this seems to be the effect
of a classification of balance sheet items into ."proprietary and
non-proprietary equities."
Melvin G. Dakin*
JURISPRUDENCE-ITs AMERICAN

PROPHETS,

by Harold Gill Reusch-

lein. The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, 1951. Pp.
xvii, 527.
This work presents the views of some seventy different
American writers in a loosely-constructed, badly proof-read, but
on the whole remarkably faithful paraphrase. The task the
author took on himself was truly a formidable one. Long articles
had to be summarized in a few sentences, whole books in a couple
of paragraphs. To accomplish this condensation without committing egregious blunders is itself an achievement of some importance.
But the book displays more important qualities than mere
industry and breadth of coverage. The author has a remarkable
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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talent for a sympathetic and understanding presentation of views
with which he disagrees. He makes no use of a device that has
become almost standard in jurisprudential polemics, that is, a
snide undercutting of the opponent's position in the process of
restating it. Instead he lets each writer in turn put his best
foot forward, and where criticisms are offered, which is seldom,
they are expressed modestly and at the conclusion of the discussion.
Professor Reuschlein divides his book into three sections.
The first-largely a summary of colonial thinking about lawbears the title, "The Ante-'Taught Law' Period in the United
States." The next section covers the period of "taught law"
from its beginnings to Holmes and Pound, passing in review
such men as Wilson, Kent, Story, Livingston, Carter, Gray,
Hohfeld and Brooks Adams. The final section, devoted to "Our
Contemporaries," opens with chapters on "The Fatherhood of
Holmes" and "The Pre-emptive Roscoe Pound." For a better
understanding of Pound the author includes a summary-running
about twenty-five pages-of the views of the European writers
who chiefly influenced Pound's thought.
Other "contemporaries". are grouped together as forming
schools or movements of thought. "The Realists" include Bingham, Arnold, Llewellyn, Green, Frank, Radin, Yntema, Douglas,
Felix Cohen, Lerner, Nelles, Powell, Rodell, Laski and Garlan.
(Cook and Oliphant are given separate treatment under the
heading, "The Scientific Method.") Next in numbers to the
Realists are "The Neo-Scholastics," all of whom are of Catholic
faith with the, should I say, possible exception of Mortimer
Adler. (Though Robert Hutchins makes a one-paragraph appearance under this heading, Reuschlein disclaims any intention to
classify him as a "neo-scholastic.") The final heading is a new
one borrowed from Jerome Hall, "Integrative Jurisprudence."
Its representatives (besides Pound, who has already been discussed) are Cardozo, Patterson, Cairns, Morris Cohen, Hall,
Cahn and your informant, who is very happy indeed to find
himself in such good company enrolled under so attractive a
banner.
Of the remaining "contemporaries," some apparently proved
too difficult to classify and therefore appear under separate headings. This is the case, for example, with Stone, Frankfurter,
Vanderbilt and Walton Hamilton. (I personally would have

1952]

BOOK REVIEWS

been inclined to put Hamilton under the Realists and to give
a separate heading to Arnold, who often deplores the blindness
of the "mere realist." But this is a small matter, especially since
Reuschlein seems to attach little importance to his own classifications and does his best to convey what is truly distinctive
about each man.) A scattering of writers are grouped by two's
and three's under somewhat vague headings, such as "The
Reign of Law" and "Law in a New and a Different World," the
latter standing as a common rubric for the very different and
very new legal worlds of Northrup and Lasswell-McDougal.
Even a book that discusses seventy professed and unprofessed
legal philosophers is bound to leave somebody out and any
reviewer of such a book is equally preordained to criticize the
author's judgment as to who is worth talking about. I cannot,
for example, suppress the question, why, among the neoscholastics, are the windy effusions of Ben W. Palmer discussed
for four pages while the moderate and thoughtful writings of
Miriam Theresa Rooney are passed over in silence?
Throughout his book, Professor Reuschlein urges the necessity of a closer integration of law with the other social sciences.
He discusses at length most of the ambitious programmatic
articles that play on this theme. But what of some of the actual
accomplishments in this field, such as the work of Beuscher at
Wisconsin, Hale at Columbia, Rostow at Yale, and Cavers at
Duke and Harvard, particularly in the latter's founding and
editorship of Law and Contemporary Problems? Were these
left out because jurisprudence is tacitly assumed to include
promises but not achievements? Even if the intent were to
restrict the discussion to programmatic pronouncements, one
misses the names of Beutel and Simpson, who are certainly
more significant and have presented more workable projects
than, say, Lee J. Loevenger.
Finally, one is startled to see the statement on page 314 that,
with the exception of Jerome Hall, "juristic writers, when confronted with the problem of crime, seem unable to get an idea
on' the subject," so that "all recent advances in criminology have
been made by psychiatrists and sociologists." Surely this is a
bit stiff in view of the work of Wechsler, Harno, Dession, Warner
ana the Gluecks.
Albert Schweitzer has said that at a time marked approximately by the beginning of the present century philosophy
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ceased to be philosophy and became merely the history of philosophy. Now that the realist movement has largely exhausted
its contribution, there is a considerable danger, it seems to me,
that jurisprudence will become merely the history of jurisprudence. The last decade has seen the publication of a great many
general treatises on jurisprudence, by Stone, Bodenheimer, Friedmann, Paton and others, including now Reuschlein. By and
large these books, though not free from avowed or unavowed
editorial comment, are discussions of what other people have
said. They are, in short, histories of jurisprudence, not jurisprudence.
All of this is by way of leading up to the suggestion that
Professor Reuschlein take as his next task, not writing another
book about what other people have written, but a thorough, presentation of the neo-Thomist point of view to which he personally subscribes. It seems to me that such a work is badly needed.
Reuschlein speaks repeatedly of a resurgence in recent years of
the neo-Thomist legal philosophy, yet he nowhere attempts to
define just what that philosophy is. When one turns to the
writings on both sides of this question one finds that they are
largely polemic and even vituperative in character and center
about an attack on, or a defense of Holmes.
As I read these articles, which have been so numerous in
recent years in the American Bar Association Journal, I keep
asking myself, just what is this neo-Thomist legal philosophy
that is creating such a stir? I know, of course, that Catholics
are likely to have certain views concerning legislation affecting
divorce and contraception. But can this outcropping of religious
views into the legislative field be called a legal philosophy?
Christian Scientists in a number of communities have opposed
the fluoridation of the municipal water supply. No one supposes
on that account that there is a Christian Scientist philosophy
of law.
What does the neo-Thomist philosophy say about such questions as the interpretation of statutes, the proper role of the
judiciary, or the methods of reconciling freedom and control in
our complex modern society? I find no coherent answer to
questions of this sort in the published professions of this philosophy. It may be answered that the binding cement for the
whole neo-Thomist jurisprudence is to be found in the writings
of St. Thomas himself. Though there are some startling things
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in St. Thomas on such subjects as monsters and angels, I personally have found him full of useful wisdom on matters of law
and government. But curiously most of the neo-Thomist writings in the legal field are almost destitute of reference to St.
Thomas himself, who taught, as I read him, that positive law is
a human thing intended to promote the happiness of human
beings.
Though Professor Reuschlein found it necessary to fill in
the European background of Pound's thinking by a long digression, he apparently felt no need for a similar introduction to the
neo-scholastic philosophy, and there is no real exposition of what
St. Thomas thought to be found in the book. What I hope is that
Professor Reuschlein will next attempt a book that will present
us with what may be truly called a neo-Thomist philosophy of
law. The publication of such a book might convert the seemingly endless exchange over the grave of Holmes of epithets
like "absolutist," "relativist," "authoritarian," and "positivist"
into a serious discussion of intellectual issues.
In closing I do, not wish to leave the impression that ProfessorReuschlein's professed adherence to the neo-Thomist legal
philosophy in any way impairs the utility of his book for those
who thinlX they would find that philosophy uncongenial. On the
contrary, the outstanding quality of the book, as I have already
suggested, is its scrupulous fairness and the faithfulness with
which it presents all points of view.
Lon L. Fuller*
by Wex
S. Malone. West Publishing Company, St. Paul, 1951. Pp.
740. $15.00.

LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE,

Workmen's Compensation is a problem subject in the law
schools. As the pressure on the curriculum has increased, only a
small remnant may be found, sometimes in the course on agency
and sometimes in torts. There remains a large uncovered field of
great importance to millions of workers and of great interest to
the 4000 or 5000 lawyers largely engaged in dealing with industrial accidents. In the absence of law school teaching, it is
imperative that clearly written and carefully prepared treatises
should be available. Since there is no uniformity in the statutory
* Carter Professor of General Jurisprudence, Harvard Law School.

